William Mallory... 的个人资料William Mallory Kent - C...日志列表 工具 帮助

日志


12月20日

Life Term Supervised Release for Felon in Possession is Error

The Eleventh Circuit has recently held that it is error to impose a life term of supervised release on a charge of felon in possession of a firearm:
 
The district court erred by sentencing Thrift to a life term of supervised release for possession of a firearm as a felon. In United States v. Rhodes, 177 F.3d 963 (11th Cir.1999), this Court faced exactly the same situation. The defendant, in Rhodes, was found guilty for one count of making a false compensation claim and one count of mail fraud. Id. at 964-65. The district court sentenced Rhodes to 12 months imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release on each count, with the terms to run concurrently. Id. at 965. Rhodes appealed the three-year sentence of supervised release on count one because the statute carried a one-year maximum term. Id. at 967. This Court agreed that the term of supervised release for count one exceeded the statutory maximum and vacated that portion of the sentence, instructing the district court to amend its judgment to impose a one-year term of supervised release for that conviction. Id. at 968.

We believe the same result is appropriate in this case. As in Rhodes, the district court sentenced Thrift to identical terms of supervised release on all counts with the terms to run concurrently. Also like Rhodes, one of the terms was higher than the statutory maximum of the counts. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2). Accordingly, we vacate that portion of Thrift's sentence and instruct the district court to impose a three-year term of supervised release for that conviction.


U.S. v. Thrift  2006 WL 3713692, *2 (C.A.11 (Ala. (C.A.11 (Ala.),2006)
12月19日

Federal Criminal Law Updates

I maintain a running list of favorable federal and Florida criminal appellate decisions on my office webpage-legal updates page.  You might want to bookmark this link and check it from time to time if you are interested in federal criminal defense.  http://www.williamkent.com/Legal%20News.html

Important Immigration Law News for Persons With Criminal Convictions

1.   December 5, 2006 - New Supreme Court decision impacts immigration.  The term "aggravated felony," which is defined in accordance with federal sentencing statutes and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines as including "any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act," does not include state crimes that are treated as felonies under state law but that would be treated as a misdemeanor under the CSA--at least not for purposes of deportation, the U.S. Supreme Court held Dec. 5. Although the court dismissed a companion case that more directly presented the federal sentencing issues, the court's opinion makes clear that its interpretation of "aggravated felony" would inform federal sentencing as well. (Lopez v. Gonzales, U.S., No. 05-547, 12/5/06; and Toledo-Flores v. United States, U.S., No. 05-7664, 12/5/06.  For more information see our webpage at www.williamkent.com

2.   For Persons with Prior Florida Criminal Convictions - Florida's Supreme Court established a simple and defendant favorable procedure using Rule 3.850 in Peart v. State for challenging guilty pleas which resulted in criminal convictions which were later being used by immigration (INS ICE) to order a person removed or deported.  The Florida Supreme Court has recently changed the rules in State v. Green which will apply to such motions, making them much more difficult to win in the future, but for now, immigrants will have two years from the date of the Green decision to continue to bring their challenges to prior convictions under the old, Peart rules.  The deadline for using Peart will be October 26, 2008 and the deadline for using Peart and protecting your federal habeas rights may be October 26, 2007.  If you have a prior Florida criminal conviction which may be used against you for deportation purposes and need to see if it can be set aside, please call our office for more information if this may apply to your case.  You can learn more at our webpage www.williamkent.com.   

Supreme Court Booker Update

The Supreme Court appears to be holding petitions that raise Booker "reasonableness" questions, pending decision of a case to further address Booker's remedies.  Friday, November 3, 2006 the Supreme Court granted certiorari in two new cases, Rita and Claiborne v. United States to decide whether a sentence within the guideline range is presumptively reasonable and to decide if a sentence outside the guideline range must be supported by extraordinary factors.

Please go to my web page, www.williamkent.com, for a copy of the transcript of the oral argument at the Supreme Court on the Cunningham v. California case, October 11, 2006.

Supreme Court granted certiorari June 5, 2006 in Burton v. Waddington, now styled Burton v. Stewart, a case that may determine retroactivity of Blakely and Booker for habeas purposes.  Please go to my webpage, www.williamkent.com for a copy of the transcript of the oral argument in Burton.  Note particularly pages 19-26. 

Florida's "Use of a Deadly Weapon"

Florida's "Use of a Deadly Weapon"

The Florida Fourth DCA has recently held in Munoz-Perez v. State, that the term "uses a deadly weapon" in the aggravated battery statute means using the weapon to commit the touching that constitutes the battery. 

If this holds up, it will be very important.  In the Munoz-Perez case the defendant was alleged to have held a knife "near" the victim's throat, but apparently not touching the throat, and on these facts the denial of the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal was found to be reversible error:

He forced his way into the kitchen, grabbed her, and said two words she could not understand. When she screamed, he grabbed a sharp knife and held it near her throat.

***

Appellant also argues that, because he never touched the victim with the knife, there was insufficient evidence to prove aggravated battery, which is defined by section 784.045(1)(a)(2), Florida Statutes (2002), as follows:

(1) (a) A person commits aggravated battery who, in committing battery:

2. Uses a deadly weapon.

The issue of whether there must be a touching with the deadly weapon in order to prove aggravated battery by using a deadly weapon has not been decided by any of the cases cited by the appellant or the state. Appellant relies on three cases in which the defendant was holding a deadly weapon such as a knife or a firearm, but did not touch the victim with the knife or discharge the firearm, and the convictions were for attempted aggravated battery.

***

Our supreme court has noted that the legislature has made a distinction between carrying a weapon and using a weapon in our statutes, in State v. Baker, 452 So.2d 927 (Fla.1984), and Owens v. State, 475 So.2d 1238 (Fla.1985). We conclude, based on these cases, that the element “uses a deadly weapon” in the aggravated battery statute means using the weapon to commit the touching that constitutes the battery. The trial court should have granted appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal on the aggravated battery charge.

7月10日

Structural Error in Habeas Corpus Petitions

If a defense attorney in a criminal trial permits structural error to occur without objecting, in a context such that a reasonably competent attorney would have objected, and in a context where had the attorney objected, the error, being structural error, would have been per se reversible error, is the same error per se reversible erro in the habeas setting? 
 
There is a split in the circuits on this question, with the Sixth Circuit holding that the error is automatically reversible but the Eleventh Circuit, in a case I recently argued, held that it is not.
 
See my office blog for more information http://criminalappeal.typepad.com/my_weblog/
 
The case in issue is Jessie Earl Purvis v. Crosby.  I am hopeful the Supreme Court will grant certiorari to decide the conflict.